Articles - January 2016

Kidnapped in His Country's Service:

Ambassador Mubarak Seeks to Stabilize and Reconstruct War-Torn Yemen
By James A. Winship, Ph.D.

What a difference a year makes!

In January 2015, Dr. Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak was the Director of Yemeni President Hadi’s presidential office and custodian of a long national reconciliation process that sought to rebuild Yemen out of a pastiche of regional fragments, traditional loyalties and dashed hopes of government reform. On January 17, 2015, Mubarak was kidnapped and held prisoner for 12 days by a rebel group opposed to a new federal constitution for Yemen. He was kept blindfolded and moved from place to place around the country before his release.

H.E. Dr. Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak presented his credentials as Ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to the United States to President Obama in August 2015.  Acceptance of Mubarak’s credentials brought to an end a three-year hiatus in Yemen’s diplomatic representation in Washington caused by tumultuous political events in that country, which resulted in the resignation of the long-time Yemeni Ambassador in Washington. Still, the country’s diplomacy was left in the complicated position of having the internationally recognized government of President Hadi, operating either from exile in Saudi Arabia or from his temporary Yemeni capital in Aden, representing it in Washington even as that government was being contested in Yemen.

Ambassador Mubarak’s role in Washington assumes considerable importance because Yemen’s local conflict has become a proxy war between the major contesting regional powers – Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Yemen’s location in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula and astride international shipping routes passing from the Arabian Sea through the Bab el Mandeb Strait and into the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal gives it outsized geostrategic importance to international energy supply lines and to developments in the Horn of Africa.

What was historically an internal conflict, characterized by deep fragmentation between communities and social groups with perceived cultural differences and conflicting territorial claims, created a power vacuum across Yemen that provided fertile ground for extremist groups and terrorist activities, including the emergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen’s corner of the Arabian Peninsula has now become a theater in the global effort to resist Islamic extremism and the terrorist attacks it spawns.

These factors have served to internationalize the conflict in Yemen: attracting the attention of the United States, which staged drone aircraft there; bringing Iran to the assistance of rebel forces known as the Houthis with heavy weapons and other resources. This, in turn, drew in a Saudi Arabian-led coalition of regional Arab states from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that has engaged in an extensive air war against the rebels and expanded to include forces on the ground.

The multilayered civil conflict in Yemen is characterized by historical enmities between tribes, harsh and varied geography that ranges from isolated mountains to sea coasts, cultural differences, limited resources and disparate colonial histories between the country’s North and South. Yemen as a locale, as an idea in people’s minds – “I am Yemeni,” – preceded the idea of Yemen as a nation-state.  Building a modern state on top of traditional structures of rule that involve primarily family, clan, tribe . . . and regions is like trying to put together a puzzle on top of a puzzle.

A graphic in a recent edition of a major international news publication characterized Yemen as one of the “failed states” in the Middle East and North Africa region. The other two are Syria and Libya. Ambassador Mubarak, however, is unwilling to accept that description. He still believes in the vision of a federal Yemen with a new constitution that tolerates substantial regional autonomy while preserving the historical heritage of Yemen, mending the political fabric of the country, rejecting extremism, limiting foreign interference and rebuilding a national economy that can be integrated into the global trading system.

Ambassador Mubarak was kind enough to grant Diplomatic Connections his first formal interview in the United States. We explored with him the complexities of the situation in Yemen, and he offered us insights into past events, into the ways those events have frequently been misunderstood in the international press, and possible future directions for his country. All leavened with persistent optimism and a measure of hope, tempered by realism.

Diplomatic Connections: Yemen, is deeply torn by political strife and violence at the moment. The elected President of Yemen, President Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi, has just returned to Yemen after being in exile for several months in Saudi Arabia. Given the terribly disrupted situation in your country, who do you represent here in Washington at this point?

Ambassador Mubarak: I am representing the Republic and people of Yemen, and its leadership constituting the legitimate government of Yemen. President Hadi, the elected president of our country, represents legitimacy and also the interests of the people.

Diplomatic Connections: You hold a Ph.D. in Business Administration and an MBA from the University of Baghdad. You began your career as an academic at Sana’a University. How did you make your way into politics and diplomacy work?

Ambassador Mubarak: I must say that I miss the nice days of being an academician. But, at the same time I have been fascinated to link the realities of politics and diplomacy with the theoretical insights that I gained in my academic training. In 2011, Yemenis, mainly the young people started voicing their demands in the street. “Change Square,” where youth mounted their protest against the government of Yemen, was right next to the university. I could see it from my office. I found myself captivated, wanting to be a part of the revolution. Many of those young people were my students.

Diplomatic Connections: Was that the beginning of the “Arab Spring” in Yemen?

Ambassador Mubarak: Yemenis began voicing their concerns about the actions of their national government and calling for reform long before the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in 2011. In 2007, the Hirak Movement or Southern Mobility Movement began to voice a demand for regional autonomy, even secession from Yemen’s North. [NOTE: The northern and southern portions of Yemen were only united under a single national government in 1990. These areas had very different colonial histories and came to independence under very different circumstances.] Our first dialogue about the future of our country began in 2008-2009.

I was on the university faculty, and found myself in sympathy with many of the calls for change in my country. I understood and supported the calls for a new, modern state and for fairness in social and economic life as well as paths for mobility that would allow well-educated young people to begin careers and to enjoy prosperity, equal rights and opportunities for advancement.

Diplomatic Connections: How did the course of reform proceed in Yemen?

Ambassador Mubarak: After several months of protests in Yemen in 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council submitted an initiative to all parties designed to bring about the resignation of President Saleh in exchange for granting him immunity from prosecution and transferring power to Vice-President Hadi, who would oversee a proposed new National Dialogue intended to reform the government. That National Dialogue would draft a new constitution, supervise a national referendum to approve the new constitution and oversee national elections to select a new president under the new constitution.

President Hadi worked to prepare the ground for this comprehensive National Dialogue. I was one of those presenting the youth agenda aimed at reforming the government. Traditional powers and parties dominated the political scene in Yemen. Young people, for the first time, students and young professionals together – voices that were not part of the main parties in Yemen at that time – found ourselves active participants in the process of political change. We were not just members of a party, but were suddenly voices empowered to suggest and carry out the process of political change.

This is how I started and moved from an academic career to a political career. I was first the rapporteur of the National Dialogue Preparatory Committee.  Then, I was chosen to be the Secretary General of the National Dialogue Conference, which was the first comprehensive national dialogue of its kind in Yemen, and in the region. Subsequently, I was appointed by President Hadi as his Chief of Staff, the Director of his Presidential Office.

Diplomatic Connections: When we talk about the National Dialogue Conference, who were the parties to that National Dialogue? Who was included and how were the groups selected?

Ambassador Mubarak: In Yemen we must face problems of regional, tribal, clan and family loyalties that are older and deeper than the idea of our modern nation-state. Our recent history is really one of struggling to build a national identity out of the pieces of many different identities that have established roots in the geographic area that has been defined as Yemen. Recall that current national boundaries are a relatively modern phenomenon in the Arabian Peninsula.

Diplomatic Connections: How did Yemen’s National Dialogue process seek to reshape and unify a nation-state?

Ambassador Mubarak: Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference was unique. For the first time, Yemenis committed to solving our problems using political dialogue, negotiation and peaceful means. That was a first step and it came only with difficulty.

We went through an inclusive process designed to ensure that we assembled the right representatives from across the nation. These were vertical and horizontal representations reflecting the cultural diversity of Yemeni society and digging deep into the social and economic questions that concern the security and prosperity of the people.

Based on these efforts, we started the National Dialogue. We had 565 representatives. Fifty percent of them were from the South and 50 percent were from the North and across the rest of Yemen. Thirty percent of the representatives were women and 20 percent were young people.

Diplomatic Connections: In these preparatory stages of the National Dialogue Conference there was an effort to focus on process and to be extremely inclusive. How were these efforts accepted?

Ambassador Mubarak:  The reaction was mixed. We received a great deal of support from many parties for our efforts to bring together diverse voices from across the country, including the voices of women and young people, despite the inherent conservatism of Yemeni tradition. At the same time, we were verbally attacked by many parties in the process because we gave Houthis representation in the National Dialogue Conference.

Diplomatic Connections: The media constantly identify the Houthis and their relationship with Iran as the core of the conflict in your country. Who are the Houthis and what is it they want? Where are they within your country?

Ambassador Mubarak: The Houthis, as a movement, started in 1992 when the “Believers,” or “Faithful Youth Movement,” was established by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi.  “Houthi” is the name of a family that controlled significant territory in the Northwest of Yemen. He was killed by Yemeni government forces in 2004. By that point the world media had attached the name “Houthis” to the movement that he started.

Initially theological in its approach, the movement was intended to promote a Zaidi religious revival in the Sa’dah region of Northwest Yemen. Houthis considered the growth of the Salafi [fundamentalist reform] movement in Sunni Islam as a threat to their Zaidi traditions. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh initially supported this Houthi revival in hopes of promoting regional interests that would create harmony and help to establish an internal balance of power. Saleh’s regime gave the Houthis space to develop and sustain their revival by accepting Houthi control of the Sa’dah region.

The Houthis claim that they are representing the interests of Hashemites or Zaidi tradition. We believe that they did not represent the interests of Zaidis at all. We differentiate totally between Zaidis and the Houthis. Though the Zaidis of Yemen identify with the Shi’a tradition of Islam, they are historically more moderate than the radical militants of “Twelver” Shi’ism in Iran, where the roles of religious and political leadership have been combined into a modern day theocracy as they await the coming of a currently invisible Twelfth Imam who will appear on judgment day.

What began as a doctrinal/cultural difference became politicized and militarized as Houthis sought to resist fundamentalist Sunni influences being brought to Yemen through Saudi-sponsored Salafi schools. Their goal was to resist foreign influences and to establish a regional balance of power within Yemen. Ironically, by accepting Iranian assistance in their efforts to challenge the Yemeni government, they have opened the door to greater Iranian presence in our country.

Diplomatic Connections: Were the Houthis included in the National Dialogue process and in the attempts to shape a new Yemeni government?

Ambassador Mubarak:  We took many steps to reassure the Houthis and to encourage them, as well as the secessionist movements in the South, to join in the National Dialogue.  We believed it was the proper time to maximize the opportunities for establishing a truly unified government that the National Dialogue process offered.

We accepted the Houthis, and many of the issues of greatest concern to them were addressed in the National Dialogue Conference. People close to the Houthis were part of the process at every stage of drafting a new constitution for a united Yemen. We tried to incorporate all of the Yemeni people’s dreams into a new constitution.

Diplomatic Connections: Why did this process of national reconciliation break down?

Ambassador Mubarak:  We made two main critical mistakes during this political process.

First, we accepted proposals to allow the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to remain on the political scene.  There was no requirement that he accept responsibility for the actions of his government or anything that was done in his name. I think that grant of immunity was fair to get him out of office, but accepting his continued presence on the political scene was a critical mistake.

Second, we dealt with the Houthis as a political movement despite the fact that they were an ideological militia more than a true political party. We accepted the idea of having an ideological militia armed with heavy weapons and tanks as part of the political negotiation process alongside unarmed political parties and social movements. The Houthis never really negotiated or accepted the principle of having to give something to get something in return.

The Houthis felt that they had the means to take the whole pie, so why would they accept just a small slice of what they wanted? They became even more powerful when former President Saleh and his followers sided with them. Add to that the Iranian intervention in support of the Houthis, and it became almost impossible for a true negotiation to proceed. The Houthis became an increasingly irresistible force on the ground, and they began to expand the territory under their control.

Diplomatic Connections: Does that suggest that the roots of the conflict in Yemen are more political than religious?

Ambassador Mubarak: We do not believe that the conflict in Yemen is a sectarian conflict. Historically, Yemen never had two deeply divided and distinct religious sects. We have Shafie and Zaidi schools of Islam and they are very, very close to each other. Although, the Shafie see themselves as Sunni Muslims and the Zaidi identify with the Shi’a.

Yemenis never called the Zaidis Shiite. They are a unique school of Islam all of their own. But, there is no doubt that Iran has made every effort to support the Houthi’s in their revival, to encourage the Zaidi believers to align themselves more closely with the theocratic practices of the Iranian government, and to undermine the social and political fabric of Yemen.

Diplomatic Connections: Is the relationship between the Houthis and the Iranians, then, a marriage of convenience for both?

Ambassador Mubarak: Exactly. Primarily, the Houthis have exploited their Zaidi identity to attract financial, military and international support from the Iranian regime. In turn, Iran has exploited the Houthi connection to gain a territorial foothold on the Arabian Peninsula and astride the Bab el Mandeb waterway in proximity to major international shipping routes.

Diplomatic Connections:  We are beginning to get at what is the most puzzling piece of the conflict in Yemen for Americans and for the international community. Is what is happening in Yemen essentially an internal conflict, or is it part of a larger regional war?

Ambassador Mubarak: Certainly there is widespread conflict in the region. And, certainly, outside powers have become involved in regional proxy conflicts. But, in Yemen, it is more of a Yemeni conflict. That is how it started: we faced difficult choices, either to leave Yemen to Iran and a group backed by Iran or to resist and try to limit foreign influence in our country.  What is happening in Yemen has major international implications, but it is more an internal conflict.

Diplomatic Connections: Additionally, is what is happening in Yemen today a “proxy” war, an arena of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran?

Ambassador Mubarak: Iran is primarily interested in Yemen because it wants to outflank Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries by undermining their borders. Even if Iran does not develop a nuclear capacity, control of Yemen could yield it significant power to disrupt global energy trade, especially when it is coupled with their potential ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Diplomatic Connections: How would you characterize the role of the United States in these events? It is clear that there was a concern about the rise of AQAP in Yemen. There was a concern about Yemen as a haven for terrorist groups, even without the approval of the Yemeni government. In turn, that led to a greater American involvement, and eventually to the United States launching drone flights from facilities in your country.

Did that American involvement make matters worse and possibly contribute to the perception that foreign powers were taking over the conflict in Yemen?

Ambassador Mubarak: Yemen and the United States are facing the same threats in the region. We have mutual agreements on counter-terrorism activities in Yemen.  Because of links with former President Saleh, who seeks to regain power, AQAP benefitted from the political vacuum that occurred in Yemen.  Because of the Houthis resistance and their expanded control of territory in Yemen, extremists from Iran have been able to have more space to operate in Yemen.
 
We take these issues of extremism seriously as a national government. We are dealing with both sorts of extremism. Otherwise, all of the extremists, – whether from the Houthi side or from the Jihadi [AQAP] side, will benefit from disorder, from the absence of a stable and moderate setting in Yemen.

Diplomatic Connections: The Saudi Arabian involvement in Yemen, intended to support the government of President Hadi and to force the Houthis from the territory they occupy, has spread a great deal of destruction because of the heavy aerial bombardment tactics they have employed as well deploying some forces on the ground. GCC forces, both air and ground, have been involved in trying to liberate areas of the country, but the result of these efforts has been enormous destruction.

Are the Saudis seen as allies of the legitimate Yemeni government, or are they seen increasingly by the people of Yemen as destroyers more than saviors?

Ambassador Mubarak: Most Yemenis appreciate what the military coalition is doing for them. Many have lost their homes and businesses and quite possibly their relatives because of the protracted violence. Wars are painful and always considered a last resort. However, had the coalition not intervened in Yemen, total chaos would have plagued the entire country. Various ideological armed groups would have spontaneously sprung up to counter the Houthi military advances. Disorder and disarray, similar to what Syria is experiencing, would have led to in-fighting among disparate communities across the nation.

The coalition intervention, with all of its drawbacks, has actually served to rationalize the conflict in Yemen – by upholding the legitimate government of Yemen and uniting the forces, led by the New National Army, that are countering the Houthi militia thereby avoiding a complete and total collapse of the state.

For us the problem is that too much of the media coverage focuses on the coalition bombing, almost to the exclusion of covering the extensive damage done by the Houthi attacks on communities and infrastructure. The media do not shed enough light on the destruction done by the Houthis and their militias, most of it caused by shelling from mortars and field guns as well as from Katyusha rockets supplied to them by Iran.

It is true that mistakes have been made and that unintended targets have been hit during the coalition military campaign. But, we are willing to submit to any kind of an independent investigation designed to uncover what happened in specific situations, especially relating to claims that hospitals and civilian targets were attacked.

Diplomatic Connections: From your government’s point of view the Saudi-led coalition and its “Operation Decisive Storm,” launched in March 2015, then followed by “Operation Restore Hope” launched a month later were necessary evils, violence launched only as a last resort against illegitimate forces that sought to take over control of Yemen. Is that right?

Ambassador Mubarak: The Houthi militias and their suppliers decided to break down all the political processes in Yemen. They encircled and took control of the capital city Sana’a. They moved from Sana’a to Dhamar, to Ibb, to Ta’iz moving southward, occupying cities and killing anyone who resisted. Thousands of people have been killed during the advance of the Houthi militias.

If we didn’t have the Coalition intervention we would not have been able to mount any continued resistance to the Houthi militias supported by Iran. We were faced with very difficult choices. Either accept the Houthi occupation of large parts of the country or call for international assistance.

Diplomatic Connections: What gives you cause for hope when your country has been pulled apart in so many different directions and that peace can be reestablished?

Ambassador Mubarak: Yemen is one of the oldest civilizations in the world and the people claim a special measure of wisdom based on their long history. Yemenis are good on compromise, and they are good deal-makers.

I was the Secretary General for the National Dialogue when we started that dialogue. On the first day, we were in a venue where you had the victim and the killer in the same room. The new president and representatives of the deposed president were there. The Houthis and the separatists from the South were there. Men and women were there. No one believed that we could reach an agreement. We spent 10 months. It was tough negotiating. But, in the end we reached a kind of consensus on what Yemenis needed and wanted.

Diplomatic Connections: How does, then, does Yemen move forward?

Ambassador Mubarak: Yemen is a poor country and cannot afford more war. We need peace. I believe that most of the Yemenis have received this message even in the midst of the violence that continues. Despite repeated setbacks, there is still hope to resolve our problems peacefully and to be about the business of rebuilding our country.

We have a working draft of a new constitution. Additionally, we have a feasible road map in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, which was approved by 14 members of the Security Council with no negative votes and one abstention by the Russian Federation. Though the first two rounds of negotiations in Switzerland failed to make progress, the changing situation on the ground with our government in control of more and more territory, leads me to hope for a breakthrough in the third round of talks scheduled for early in 2016.

Diplomatic Connections: Your people are looking ahead and asking: What is the future of Yemen?

Ambassador Mubarak:  We are not a people – despite what events may make it appear – who revel in civil war. We have called our brothers in the GCC to help us reverse the results of the coup done by the Houthis and former President Saleh that forced President Hadi to leave Yemen for a period of months. After all the country has been through, I think the majority of the Yemeni people believe that we have to stop this conflict and return to the program we have previously agreed upon: completing the reform initiatives proposed in the National Dialogue, considering and adopting the proposed new constitution.            

The events of the past year have not made that task any easier, but I continue to believe it is possible. Yemen is a part of the Arab Peninsula. We envision the cooperation of the Arab nation and the Saudi state, but we cannot understand Iranian meddling.

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